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The official government news agency ITAR-TASS earlier this year quoted Defense 
Minister Igor D. Sergeev as having told senior military personnel that about 18,000 of 
their officers had been charged with criminal activity during 1997. He warned that 
organized crime sought to penetrate armed forces construction projects, access to 
weapons, and to use the military as a medium for the growing drug trade. Last year, an 
official announcement had mentioned that 26 generals and 100 colonels were under 
investigation for corrupt activities.(2)
Colonel General Yuri G. Demin, chief military prosecutor, recently gave an interview on 
the same subject. He stated that during the first half of 1998, crime had increased by 12 
percent in the army and navy, with drug-related cases up 70 percent. These figures 
suggest a dramatic growth in corruption throughout the Russian military establishment. 
Demin also mentioned the former chief of the General Staff, Army General Mikhail P. 
Kolesnikov, and a former commander of Russian forces in the Transcaucasus, General 
Fedor M. Reut, as being under investigation.(3)
One of the difficulties in reversing these trends is that the government in Moscow 
includes about ten different law enforcement structures which lack coordination as well 
as professional expertise. The other problem is funding. Of the estimated 23 trillion 
rubles required to implement an effective anti-crime program, only four trillion had been 
appropriated during the preceding three years.(4) Yet another obstacle is represented 
by the State Duma which provided amnesties to 13 of the 14 generals who had been 
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convicted of various crimes between 1996 and July 1998. The justification? They had 
fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya or one of the lesser "hot spots" on Russia's 
periphery. (5)
Definitions
An expert study defines the dimension of organized crime in Russia's armed forces as 
follows: "smuggling crimes of all types (particularly drug and arms trafficking), the 
massive diversion of equipment and materials, illegal business ventures, and coercion 
and criminal violence... financial crimes and schemes involving a spectrum of banks and 
financial organizations, real and dummy corporations, joint ventures with foreign 
partners, and overseas money laundering schemes...."(6) Not all of these elements will 
be discussed in this brief essay.
Another source pointed out that some of the above corrupt practices had been prevalent 
also in the former Soviet armed forces prior to their partial disintegration in May 1992, 
when a strictly Russian military organization was established. These included 
"patronage and its closely associated partner, protectionism, and secrecy, privileges, 
and blat'. (7) Obviously, such an environment has been conducive to development of 
crime on a massive scale in today's armed forces.
Finally, one should mention that Transparency International, a non-governmental 
pressure group in Berlin, earlier this year rated Russia as 6th (out of 54 listed countries) 
in terms of the most corrupt countries in the world, with Nigeria at the top. (8)
Already in mid-1996, then Prosecutor General Yuri S. Skuratov revealed that over the 
preceding two years law enforcement agencies had launched 267 criminal cases 
involving military corruption: 36 officers had been convicted of taking bribes during 
1995; some 30 more were under investigation; and "several dozen" others had been 
forced to leave the armed forces.(9)
2
The Rokhlin Case
The individual who widely publicized corruption among his fellow flag officers was 
Lieutenant General Lev Ya. Rokhlin, retired after commanding the 8th Guards Army 
Corps and then elected a deputy to the State Duma, where he delivered an important 
address on 5 July 1996. This statement revealed that a Russian firm named Lyukon had 
contracted with the defense ministry to build 600 apartments for retired officers. Despite 
the fact that the ground was never broken for that project, a second contract was signed 
later to construct 10 times as many or 6,000 more apartments at a different location. 
Co-founder of the company was a son of Army General Konstantin I. Kobets, then chief 
military inspector, who had interceded with Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev to 
"compensate" Lyukon with aircraft engines and other equipment. This was done.(10)
Rokhlin also mentioned other examples of high-level corruption, as follows:
• Some $23 million from the sale of ammunition to Bulgaria, received by Colonel 
General Vasili V. Vorobev (then budget chief at the defense ministry), had 
disappeared. No steps were taken against Vorobev as of that time.
• Colonel General Dmitri K. Kharchenko (whose daughter married Defense Minister 
Grachev's son) converted $5 million into rubles, depositing them with the Military 
Insurance Company at 5 percent interest (bank rates then were between 120 
percent and 180 percent) and subsequently transferring only R830 million instead 
of R13 billion to the defense ministry.
• Colonel General Vyacheslav V. Zherebtsov, mobilization chief, established a 
battalion of "slave" soldiers whose purpose involved making money from building 
dachas for other generals, four of these for himself. (Between 1992 and 1996, 
about 300 generals built dachas near Moscow, using embezzled materials and 
enlisted men as labor.) (11)
• Colonel General Vladimir T. Churanov, chief of rear services (supply), conducted 
operations through private commercial firms, with enormous abuses in allocating 
apartments and in army surplus property sales.
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• Military hardware and weapons were sold illegally from the former Western, 
Central, Northern, and Southern Groups of Forces; Mongolia; and the Baltic 
States--comprising enough to wage a large-scale war. As a result, not enough 
equipment remained for a local war like the one in Chechnya.
Rokhlin's speech provoked an article by a field grade officer who revealed that luxury 
Mercedes-Benz SEL-500 limousines were purchased with money from sales of surplus 
weapons in the Western Group of Forces (East Germany). Their commander, Colonel 
General Matvei P. Burlakov, had been personally involved. (12) Promoted to deputy 
defense minister, he was dismissed in January 1995 by President Yel'tsin and retired.
On 13 February 1997, Rokhlin also accused former Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev 
of clandestinely supplying Armenia with more than $1 billion worth of weapons, 
including 84 T-72 tanks, 52 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, heavy field artillery, and 
possibly SCUD-2 missiles, without authorization from Yel'tsin or the government.
Despite counter-accusations alleging that Rokhlin himself had been guilty of corruption 
during the war in Chechnya (of all places!), the general continued to make charges over 
Ekho Moskvy radio station on 20 May 1997 as well as through the printed media which 
had picked up the story. During the following year a poll among active duty army officers 
ranked Rokhlin highest among six politicians, giving him 39 percent to Yel'tsin's nine 
percent. (13)
On the night of 3 July 1998, Rokhlin was murdered at his home near Moscow. Tamara 
Pavlovna, his wife, was arrested and charged with the crime. Their daughter Yelena had 
been told by the mother that she confessed on orders of three masked intruders (who 
also killed the watchdog), because they had threatened to kill the rest of the family if she 
disobeyed.(14) As of this writing, the case was still under investigation.
Rokhlin also had been organizing opposition to the Yel'tsin regime among officers 
serving in the armed forces.(15) The apparent contract murder could have been the 
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work of a joint government-mob conspiracy, consummation of which obviously benefited 
both. Other such assassinations included the one in October 1994 of a young 
investigative journalist, Dmitri Kholodov, whose exposé (16) of corruption in the military 
resulted in his death from an explosion of a briefcase, allegedly containing documentary  
evidence which he had been seeking. In March 1995, a well-known television 
commentator, Vladislav N. List'ev, was also murdered. Neither killing has been solved.
Theft of Weapons
As a result of the USSR's disintegration during the latter part of 1991, many of the newly 
independent states came into possession of guns, ammunition, and explosives either 
left behind by withdrawing Russian military units or stolen from them prior to their 
departure. Much of this war matériel ended up in the hands of crime groups or their 
paramilitary formations. The White Book of Russian Special Services is quoted (17) as 
reporting that some 200,000 automatic weapons had fallen into the hands of these 
criminal organizations.
Another major source for weapons includes armament plants in Tula, Kovrov, Izhevsk, 
and other Russian cities which supply the black market. The most popular places from 
which to steal guns and ammunition are military garrisons as well as supply dumps. 
Many of the latter are guarded by elderly invalids or pensioners.(18) Some 31,000 
weapons were reported to have disappeared from these kinds of installations over a 
nine-month period. Prior to that a freighter was stopped at the port of Evpatoriya on the 
Black Sea with 59 tons of ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles.(19)
More recent cases included 16 torpedoes capable of carrying nuclear warheads that 
had been stolen and then mostly abandoned, although later discovered by a shipyard 
worker. Each weighed 12 tons and had been transported through town without being 
noticed. Only three were sold for about $3,000 each, after having been moved from a 
Northern Fleet mine and torpedo base in the Arkhangelsk region.(20) Theft of weapons 
escalated during the first half of 1998, with about 100 incidents registered. (21)
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The highest profile case to date involved a private company called Bonex which is being 
investigated by the general prosecutor's office. A certain Sergei Spassky, then director 
of that concern, visited San'a in May 1996. His company had failed to deliver three 
Sukhoi-17 fighter aircraft to Yemen and would not return the almost $4 million down 
payment. Spassky received asylum in the Russian embassy. He claimed to be acting on 
behalf of the official state company selling arms, Rosvooruzhenie. Bonex previously had 
delivered Scud-B missiles to North Korea. It also supplied a foreign intermediary firm 
with Igla portable anti-aircraft systems as well as R-27 and R-73 missiles. (22) Had 
these weapons systems also been stolen, in collusion with high-ranking military 
officers?
Conclusions
It has been stated that the prevalence of corruption within Russia's armed forces is 
directly related to the penetration of the central government by criminal structures. The 
State Duma, however, refuses to adopt anti-corruption legislation. Organized crime is 
sometimes called the "fifth estate" in Russia, perhaps soon to become more powerful 
than the other four: the executive, parliament, judiciary, and mass media. (23)
Unfortunately, the future does not suggest that the foregoing problems will be solved. To 
the contrary, the state property agency has announced commencement of a sale that 
will include "military aircraft, naval ships, fuel in storage, non-ferrous metals, and part of 
the real estate belonging to the Defense Ministry." It is anticipated that the government 
will bring in R400 million during the last several months of 1998. (24)
As Russia careens toward chaos, the jackals with shoulder boards will continue to steal 
from what is left in the above inventories.
Appendix
52 Flag Officers Involved in Corruption
LTG Al'bert K. 
Abramov
 Dep CO, Leningrad Military District (MD) 
(Supply)
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 LTG Vasily V. 
Akporisov
 Director, Sheremyetovo - 2 Airport
 MG Anatoly A. 
Avdoshin
 Dep CO, Western Group of Forces 
(Supply)
 COLG Matvei P. 
Burlakov
Dep Defense Minister
 COLG Viktor S. 
Chechevatov
 CO Far East MD
 COLG Vladimir T. 
Churanov
 Dep Defense Minister (Supply)
 R/ADM V. V. 
Fedoseiev
 Chief, Intl. Legal Dept., Federal Border 
Service
 R/ADM Nikolai N. 
Germanov
 CO, Submarine Unit, Pacific Fleet
 MG Vladimir D. 
Grebennikov
 Chief, Air Force Test Center
 MG Vladimir D. 
Ishutko
 Chief Engineer, Air Defense Troops
 LTG Grigori A. 
Karakozov
 Chief, Main Trade Directorate, General 
Staff (GS)
 MG Yuri A. Karev  Chief of Finance, Strategic Missile Forces
 COLG Dmitri K. 
Kharchenko
 Chief of a Main Directorate, GS
 V/ADM Vyacheslav T. 
Kharnikov
 Dep CO, Northern Fleet
 ADM Igor' N. 
Khmel'nov
 Chief of Main Staff, Navy
 LTG V. Ya. Khorkov  Dep CO, Leningrad MD (Supply)
 ARMYG Konstantin I. 
Kobets
 Dep Defense Min. (Chief Inspector)
 ARMYG Mikhail P. 
Kolesnikov
 Chief of General Staff, 1st Dep Def. Min.
 COLG Georgi G. 
Kondratiev
 Dep Defense Minister
 COLG Nikolai I. 
Kotylev
 Chief, Billeting & Maintenance, GS
 LTG A. A. Krendeleev  Air Force
 MG Yevgeni M. 
Kruglov
 Dep Chief, Main Trade Directorate, GS




 MG V.P. Kuznetsov  Finance Chief, Trans-Baikal MD
 GEN V. G. Malofeev  no record
 MG Viktor G. 
Maluzov
 Chief of Armor, North Caucasus MD
 R/ADM Mikhail A. 
Mirko
 Chief, Electronic Warfare, Northern Fleet
 MG Yuri M. Nikitin  Chief of Mobilization, Volga MD
 LTG Georgi S. Oleinik  Paymaster General
 R/ADM Aleksander V. 
Olkhovikov
 CO, Paldisi Submarine Base (Estonia), 
Baltic Fleet
 MG Petrushev  Chief, Human Resources Directorate, GS
 LTG Aleksei Potapov  Dep CO, North Caucasus MD
 COLG Fedor M. Reut  CO, Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces
 MG Vladimir V. 
Rodionov
 CO, Air Force Division
 COLG Vladimir V. 
Ruzliaiev
 CO, Caucasus Special Border District
 MG Nikolai G. 
Sadovnikov
 Chief, Main Trade Directorate, GS
 ARMYG Vladimir M. 
Semenov
 CO Ground ForcesMG
 M.P. Semin  Dep CO, Military Unit 41137
 MG Vladimir V. 
Sheikin
 Personnel Chief, North Caucasus MD
 LTG Anatoly S. 
Sivakov
 Dep CO, Air Defense (Supply)
 MG Aleksandr A. 
Sizov
 Dep CO, Trans-Baikal MD (Construction)
 MG Andrei A. 
Smirnov
 Chief, Econ. Directorate, Volga MD
 GEN V. Sokolov  no record
 MG Solomonov  Dep CO, Air Force
 COLG Anton V. 
Terentiev
 Dep CO, Ground Forces
 MG Viktor I. Tsarkov  Chief, Main Trade Directorate, GS
 R/ADM Igor F. Vdovin Chief of Liaison, Baltic Fleet
 COLG Vasili V. 
Vorobev
 Budget Chief, Defense Ministry
 MG Vladimir N. 
Yegorov
 Military Commissar, Altai Krai
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 ADM Oleg A. 
Yerofeev
 CO, Northern Fleet
 MG Anatoly P. 
Zakharov
 Chief, Civil Defense, Sverdlovsk Oblast'
 COLG Vyacheslav V. 
Zherebtsov
 Chief, Space Mobilization Directorate
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